UNION-IP Winter Roundtable 2021

 

The Union IP Roundtable, held annually towards the end of February, is a regular feature in my calendar. In previous years I have attended the meeting at the DPMA in Munich to hear discussions of various topics relevant to patent practitioners across Europe. I attended my first one as a speaker, presenting my ideas on partial priority a little while before the Enlarged Board of the EPO agreed with me. Since then, topics have covered "Smart IP", literal and non-literal infringement, and indirect infringement. The topics and speakers are always carefully chosen to encourage a range of views from different European jurisdictions, which often highlight the differences that still exist in the patent world across Europe, despite extensive harmonisation over the past few decades. 

The topic for this year's roundtable relates to the one thing it has been impossible to avoid for the past 12 months or so. The title is "IP strategy and challenges in an era of cooperation", which in essence is about what we can do in response to new challenges such as Covid-19 and how IP can help (or possibly hinder). Two main topics will be covered: how governments can balance patent rights and public health (e.g. crown use provisions and when they should be used), and whether or not to patent in the age of Covid-19 (e.g. whether it is acceptable to patent treatments to protect public health). I have my own views on these subjects, but I will certainly be interested to hear what others have to say.

The speakers at the event include Michael Fysh QC SC (former Patents County Court judge), Matthieu Dhenne (Partner at Ipsilon), Jorge Contreras (University of Utah & Open Covid Pledge co-founder), Keiko Higuchi (Mitsubishi), David Rosenberg (former GSK vice president of IP) and Nigel Clarke (patent information expert at the EPO). The full programme can be viewed here. 

As with everything else these days, the meeting will be held entirely online, so there is no excuse not to go this time. The registration fees are consequently lower than normal, being only 20 Euros for Union members and 80 for non-members. Registration is required by 25 February 2021, so book your place now. 

Craig Wright and nChain's European patents

Craig Wright is, to put it mildly, a controversial character. I will not go into the details why, as others have done this in much more detail (see for example Arthur van Peltonaut's website). It is sufficient to say here that Mr Wright has claimed, and continues to claim, to be Satoshi Nakamoto, the pseudonymous creator of Bitcoin. His claims are at best dubious and are very much contested. For what it is worth, in my opinion it is abundantly clear that he is definitely not Satoshi Nakamoto (Update 3/3/21: the late Len Sassaman probably was Satoshi). The consequences of this, which are many, have yet to be fully worked out.

Despite not being able to prove that he is who he says he is, Mr Wright has over the past few years managed to build up, via the company nChain Holdings Limited in which he plays a key role, what is now a very substantial portfolio of patent applications. On 1 February 2017, nChain started filing GB patent applications. The total number of GB applications filed in the name of nChain now stands at 290, the latest being filed on 23 December 2020. There are also a further 73 applications, all filed in 2016 in the name of EITC Holdings Limited, which have since been assigned to nChain. These applications, which invariably do not progress beyond the first 12 months in the UK, have been used as priority claims for subsequent PCT, EP, US, CN and other applications. The current state of the patent portfolio is consequently now absolutely massive and clearly represents an investment amounting to many millions of whatever fiat currency you choose to use. For a small company based in London (but registered in Antigua), this is an enormous effort, making it very much an outlier in the patent world.

To summarise the entire portfolio would be a task that is far beyond my limited abilities and available time, let alone my readers' attention span. Instead, I will just concentrate on what nChain has managed to achieve so far at the European Patent Office, which Mr Wright has acknowledged is the toughest one to get applications past. It is still relatively early days, given that we are only a few years from the earliest filing dates, but there have already been some successes. A spreadsheet I have created, which is available here, lists all 19 European patents that have been granted to nChain to date (February 2021). None of the patents has yet been opposed, and 12 have already passed the nine month opposition period. An interesting point to note is that all of them are very much computer-implemented and presumably rely on the EPO's established view that applications of cryptography are very much within the allowable area of patentability. 

Given the controversy around nChain and Mr Wright (see here), the fact that their patents have so far attracted no serious attention seems surprising to me. From my limited research so far, there is certainly the possibility that some (see for example here) may be invalid, although it is also possible that the technical relevance of nChain's patents is simply too low to be significant. However, given the huge investment so far, it would be surprising if nChain did not intend to use their patents in some way, otherwise it would be an awful lot of money to spend on what many would consider to be a narcissistic and possibly fraudulent vanity project. It would be interesting to see what others think of it, in particular if there is any relevant prior art on the granted patents that the EPO have not considered.

Update 6-10 Feb 2021: In light of the comments received so far by devoted followers of Mr Wright, I would like to add that it is very easy to verify ownership of any particular bitcoin address. Here's an example:

I, Tufty Sylvestris, confirm that I am the owner of the following address.

bc1quklwszfchvfzpxa7wk8pge7ykczcg0pv54wc8a

IA0TdtltWrzK62rDVw/WkZ36hNOGshhw8UFXySK7VFY9Nv5mQWr6B3aXpDpFH15gPH7uUJsPzlLB/T+eKkXjMWo=

Anyone can verify this unambiguously, for example by plugging the text, address and signature into a bitcoin wallet verification tool (e.g. Electrum, which I use). Craig Wright has not been able to do this for any address containing coins owned by Satoshi Nakamoto (e.g. the single address mentioned in block 0, which was definitely owned by Satoshi, who should therefore have the corresponding private key enabling the address to be signed). Therefore Craig Wright's claims to be Satoshi Nakamoto can be discounted. Hitchen's razor applies.

A allaf gael patent os gwelwch yn dda?

Something has been lost in translation. Source here.

Amser maith yn ôl ym mis Rhagfyr 2007, er fy mod yn dal i fod yn atwrnai patent dan hyfforddiant, diweddarwyd Rheolau Patentau'r DU 1995 i Reolau Patentau 2007. Arweiniodd hyn at lawer o newidiadau, gan gynnwys ail-rifo llwyr. Un o'r newidiadau gweddol fach oedd caniatáu i'r Gymraeg gael ei defnyddio fel iaith achos ar gyfer ceisiadau patent y DU, wedi'i galluogi gan newid i Reol 14 (1). Ers hynny, rwyf wedi cadw llygad o bryd i'w gilydd a fydd rhywun byth yn canfod bod angen defnyddio'r ddarpariaeth newydd hon. Gan nad wyf yn dda iawn gydag ieithoedd, yn enwedig Cymraeg, nid oedd byth yn mynd i fod yn fi. Rhaid i rywun, roeddwn i'n meddwl, deimlo ar ryw adeg yr angen i ffeilio cais am batent yn Gymraeg, o gofio bod dros 800,000 o siaradwyr Cymraeg a rhaid bod ychydig o atwrneiod patent cymwys yn gallu eu helpu.

Ychydig flynyddoedd ar ôl i'r darpariaethau ddod i rym, gofynnais i IPO y DU faint yr oeddent wedi'i dderbyn. Yr ateb bryd hynny oedd dim. Ychydig flynyddoedd yn ddiweddarach, roeddwn i'n meddwl y byddwn i'n gofyn eto, gan feddwl yn sicr erbyn hynny mae'n rhaid bod rhywfaint wedi bod. Yn anffodus yr ateb oedd na.

Mae bron i 13 mlynedd bellach ers i'r Rheolau gael eu newid, felly roeddwn i'n meddwl y byddwn i'n diweddaru fy nghais Rhyddid Gwybodaeth yn yr IPO. Rwyf newydd gael gwybod nad yw'r IPO erioed wedi derbyn unrhyw geisiadau patent a ffeiliwyd yn Gymraeg. A all rhywun fy atgoffa beth oedd pwynt y newid yn y Rheolau?

Corrections and Conflicts of Interest

Rule 7 of the IPReg Rules of Conduct, which applies to Chartered Patent Attorneys in the UK, states (in part) that "A regulated person must not act where his interests conflict with those of a client or of a former client". There is a proviso that allows such a conflict to continue, provided "all of the parties have given their informed consent in writing", but a regulated person "must, however, refuse to act on behalf of conflicting or potentially conflicting parties in contentious matters, in circumstances where the regulated person's actions would not be seen to be neutral or where accepting instructions from both parties would risk a breach of Rule 5 [carrying out professional work in a timely manner and with proper regard for standards of professional service and client care] or Rule 8 [keeping the affairs of clients and former clients confidential] cannot be observed".

Bearing the above in mind, I will set out a possible situation. Let's say you are a patent attorney doing a typical task of engaging a new client (Mr S), who wants to get a UK patent application prepared and filed. You work with Mr S and get the application prepared and filed in November 2017, filing it in his name without paying any fees. So far so good. All seems to be in order, and you wait until near the time for sorting the fees out by the first anniversary. However, ten months afterwards in September 2018 you find out that your client has decided to engage the services of a different patent attorney by filing a Form 51 himself. While unusual, this is not unheard of and Mr S is perfectly within his rights. You then, for the avoidance of doubt, on 17 September 2018 confirm to the UK IPO that you withdraw your representation. Normally that would be an end of it as far as you are concerned. While you might be disappointed to lose your client to a bigger firm of patent attorneys, there is nothing you can do about it. However, shortly after withdrawing your representation you are contacted by Mr H, who says that he worked with Mr S in developing the invention you prepared and filed the patent application for. Mr H is in an ongoing dispute with Mr S about the invention and the company Mr S has set up to commercialise it, and there is a disagreement about who should be named as inventor and applicant on the application. Mr H seeks your advice on what you can do to help him with this, now that you no longer represent Mr S.

At this point, even without having to consult the IPReg Rules of Conduct, you should of course inform Mr H that you unfortunately cannot act for him because this would conflict with the interests of Mr S, your former client and doing so would be against the rules. You advise Mr H that there are plenty of other patent attorneys he can choose from, pointing him in the direction of the register of patent attorneys on the IPReg website. Although unhappy not to be able to engage your services because you already have a good knowledge of the invention, Mr H would then go off to engage someone else and you can then get on with other less contentious things. 

However, this is not what actually happens. Instead, three days after confirming your withdrawal of representation to the UK IPO, you write to the IPO seeking a correction under Section 117 to the applicant, which you had previously identified as Mr S on filing the application, asking that Mr H is also named as applicant and inventor. After some head-scratching, the IPO informs the new representative about the request for correction. Unsurprisingly, the new representative objects and the IPO then decides to refuse the request, suggesting that a reference under Section 8 (entitlement) should be filed to resolve any dispute over who should be identified as inventor and applicant. You nevertheless persist in arguing that a correction under Section 117 should be allowed. The new representative, of course, disagrees and the dispute eventually results in a hearing being held to resolve the issue. In the view of the hearing officer, Section 117 cannot be used to circumvent the more specific legal provisions of Sections 8 and 13, in line with the well known principle generalia specialibus non derogant (the general cannot overrule the specific). You argue that you knew that Mr H was a co-inventor at the time of filing the application but failed to enter his name in error. The hearing officer, however, does not believe you because the error was not the result of a single isolated oversight on Form 1 but also involved stating that all the applicants were inventors and that there were no other inventors. In other words, in the hearing officer's view, you positively affirmed that there were no other inventors when filing the application, making the possibility of this being an error very unlikely. The error was also not noticed until nearly a year afterwards, and only shortly after you withdrew your representation. The hearing officer, unsurprisingly, refuses your request for correction. 

What I am wondering about now is not whether the decision to refuse the correction was correct, as it was clearly a complete non-starter, but instead what position you, as a regulated patent attorney, are now in. Have you acted in accordance with the Rules of Conduct? If not, what should happen? As you might have guessed by now, the situation is not hypothetical but actually happened*. The case can be easily found by those who know where to look.

*UPDATE 17/9/20: Based on information I have received since the above post was published, the hypothetical case could have been slightly different to how I have put it, although given that the actual details are not on the public record it not possible to tell. Let's suppose instead that you were acting for both Mr H and Mr S originally, being instructed principally by Mr S. After the application was filed, Mr S got involved in a dispute with Mr H and, being named as sole applicant, took the patent application with him to the new representative. Does this alter the conclusion about whether there was a conflict?

UPDATE 18/9/20: Following several discussions about how the scenario might possibly be interpreted as not resulting in a conflict, one possibility raised is that your client was originally, and continued to be, Mr H. It might then be argued that continuing to represent Mr H would not be a conflict, since he was always your client and he was the one who paid the bills, while Mr S was only the inventor and applicant. This would require Rule 7 to be interpreted to exclude Mr S from being your client, thereby excluding you from being conflicted. Unfortunately for you, this runs against the definition of "client" provided in Rule 1, which is given as "the principal on whose behalf a regulated person acts as agent and includes any person for whom the regulated person is address for service for any right regardless of the nature of any current relationship". Mr S was the named applicant and you were identified as the address for service in communications from the IPO before Mr S took representation elsewhere. Mr S was therefore a client within the meaning of the rules, becoming a former client afterwards, whether or not Mr H was as well. I wonder if anyone can think of a plausible way around this. 

Patent Office Opinions - s73 Revocations

Since 1 October 2014 it became possible for a request for a Patent Office Opinion under Section 74A to result in revocation, as a result of Section 73 being amended to include subsections 1A-1C, which state:

(1A) Where the comptroller issues an opinion under section 74A that section 1(1)(a) or (b) [novelty or inventive step] is not satisfied in relation to an invention for which there is a patent, the comptroller may revoke the patent.

(1B) The power under subsection (1A) may not be exercised before

(a) the end of the period in which the proprietor of the patent may apply under the rules (by virtue of section 74B) for a review of the opinion, or

(b) if the proprietor applies for a review, the decision on the review is made (or, if there is an appeal against that decision, the appeal is determined).

(1C) The comptroller shall not exercise the power under subsection (1A) without giving the proprietor of the patent an opportunity to make any observations and to amend the specification of the patent without contravening section 76.

Regular readers will know that I have been keeping an eye on the outcomes of Opinions for the past few years, and have written a few posts on the subject. It has now been nearly six years since the amendment came into force, and it seems a good time to provide an update on where things are now. 

Out of around 90 Opinions that have issued to date, 43 have found the patent in question to be invalid for lack of novelty and/or inventive step. Of these, a final decision has been made in 36 cases, whether this is to take no action, maintain the patent as amended or to revoke. The IPO has indicated that revocation will only be done in 'clear cut' cases. In practice this means that if an Opinion finds a patent invalid and the proprietor does nothing about it, there is a strong chance that the decision will be to revoke. In cases where the proprietor contests the Opinion's finding, however, the chances of getting the patent revoked, based on the information to date, reduces to zero. In some cases the proprietor will want to amend their patent, while in others they might contest the finding by filing arguments or requesting a review under section 74b. In all cases so far this has resulted in the IPO deciding not to proceed with revocation. 

The chart below summarises the 36 cases where a decision has been made. In half of them, no action was taken, i.e. the Comptroller decided that the patent was not sufficiently clearly invalid to justify being revoked. Of the other half, 12 have resulted in the patent being amended, either via post-grant amendments under section 27 or central limitation via Article 105a EPC. In only 6 cases has the patent been revoked. The details of each of these cases are provided in the table below, with links to the Opinion, patent register and the decision. In each case the proprietor did nothing in response to the initiation of revocation proceedings under section 73(1A). 

It is perhaps not surprising that the IPO decide in the great majority of cases not to proceed with revocation following a negative Opinion, given that the procedure under section 74a is strictly time-limited and decided only on the papers after a single round of correspondence with the patent proprietor. The opportunity to provide evidence that would normally be possible during court proceedings is not available under section 74a so the benefit of any doubt, whether reasonable or not, is clearly given to the proprietor. Anyone who might think that the Opinion service could be a quick and cheap way to get rid of a troublesome patent is therefore very likely to be disappointed if the patent proprietor decides to put up any level of resistance. However, given that there are no estoppel issues that would prevent similar, or expanded, arguments being put later in revocations proceedings, the Opinions service could be seen as a useful way of trying out a case to see what might work without committing to any particular aspect, the only downside being that the proprietor will then be forewarned and ready next time. This seems to have been used in only one case so far though, based on the information available from the IPO Ipsum register. 

What is surprising, to me at least, is how little the Opinions service has been used. Is this due to a general reluctance to put arguments on the public record, or is it something else? Are enough people even aware of the possibility of requesting an Opinion when an issue of validity or infringement comes up? Could it be a factor that those who are experienced in litigation proceedings are unwilling to advise their clients to use it? It is still a puzzle to me. 

 

Opinion	Proprietor	Patent No.	Opinion Result	Status (23/7/20)
04/15	Fujifilm Corporation	EP1837182	Lack of novelty	Revoked
14/15	Albertus Abraham Petrus de Groot	GB2508152	Lack of novelty	Revoked
02/16	Shane Kelly	EP2160936	Lack of novelty	Revoked
22/16	De La Rue International	EP2493707	Lack of inventive step	Revoked
18/17	IMMOSPA AG	EP2700769	Lack of novelty	Revoked
21/18	Spectrum Technologies Plc	EP1641572	Lack of novelty	Revoked

Patenting Simulations - Is Making it More Real the Key?

It is a long time since I last got into the issue of software patents (a.k.a. computer-implemented inventions, CIIs) at the EPO. The last major event on this front was when the decision of the Enlarged Board in G 3/08 issued in May 2010, which I wrote about for the IPKat here. The decision did not, however, change the law in any respect because the referral, made by the EPO President, was decided by the EB to be inadmissible (which I, along with others, predicted would happen). There was, at the time, apparently no contradictions in the case law from the Boards of Appeal on the subject of CIIs, with the leading case being Comvik (T 641/00). Since then, the law has been remarkably stable, with no significant divergence or change of direction. The established law in the UK has also been pretty stable. In 2013 I summarised the main features and differences between the UK and EPO approaches here. Nothing much has changed since then.

The decision in T 489/14, however, issued in February 2019, attempted to put the cat among the pigeons in the field of CIIs by questioning whether the development of the case law in T 1227/05 (Infineon) was correct, or at least to what extent. As a quick reminder, the cases leading up to T 1227/05 involved methods of designing things such as integrated circuits and drill bits, with big players IBM and Halliburton respectively leading the way. There was initially resistance to patenting methods of designing things but, as the case law developed, both the EPO and the UK courts decided that in some cases it was possible to patent a method of designing without having to tie it to actually making the thing. This was expected to be of help to companies involved heavily in designing complex products but where the article being designed would be manufactured by others. The decision in T 1227/05 then went further and established that it was in principle possible to patent a method of simulating an article (in this case an electronic circuit), provided the invention was limited to that specific purpose. It was not necessary to include fabricating the article itself because specific computer-implemented simulations were themselves to be regarded as patentable and not dismissed as non-inventions for being mere computer programs. 

The application leading to T 489/14 also related to a simulation method, but in this case related to simulating movement of people in a building, rather than electrons in a circuit. Figure 2 shown here shows people moving along a corridor and taking steps according to factors such as whether there was something in the way (e.g. another person or an obstacle). The application was refused because it was considered to be obvious over a general purpose computer, following the usual practice in T 641/00, although the application did cite prior art relating to previous techniques for modelling pedestrian flow in buildings. The applicant appealed, and argued that the aspects of the simulation that were based on human behaviour were modelled by equations similar to those describing the laws of physics and the application should be patentable for similar reasons as in T 1227/05. The Board saw that the applicant had a good argument but was still reluctant to allow the appeal because the simulation only assisted an engineer in the cognitive process of designing something, whether this was a circuit or a building. Instead of following T 1227/05, the Board decided that they would rather ask the Enlarged Board whether simulation methods were actually patentable. The questions put before the EB were:

1. In the assessment of inventive step, can the computer-implemented simulation of a technical system or process solve a technical problem by producing a technical effect which goes beyond the simulation's implementation on a computer, if the computer-implemented simulation is claimed as such?

2. If the answer to the first question is yes, what are the relevant criteria for assessing whether a computer-implemented simulation claimed as such solves a technical problem? In particular, is it a sufficient condition that the simulation is based, at least in part, on technical principles underlying the simulated system or process?

3. What are the answers to the first and second questions if the computer-implemented simulation is claimed as part of a design process, in particular for verifying a design?

The oral proceedings in G 1/19 were held yesterday (15 July 2020), attended in person by the Enlarged Board, the applicant's representative and representatives of the EPO President. I, along with an unknown number of others, attended virtually via a video stream. The proceedings were not particularly enlightening regarding the thinking of the EB, but we did at least get an idea that they thought question 1 was at least admissible, while there might be some doubt about whether question 2 was. The appellant, of course, argued that the bounds of what was patentable should be maintained as in T 1227/05 and should cover modelling pedestrians in buildings as well as electrons in circuits. The EPO President seemed to agree, and argued that methods of simulation were becoming increasingly important and in some cases provided alternative ways to taking measurements in the real world. The boundaries of what was considered patentable should therefore be allowed to develop over time. The only significant push back from the EB seemed to be to emphasise that they were the ones who were to decide whether any question was admissible. Just because they were asked a question did not mean that they were obliged to answer it (as of course we already know from G 3/08). 

An interesting example put forward by the EPO President was a method of simulating natural phenomena by ray tracing, in order to generate a more realistic image. Computer rendering by ray tracing could be considered patentable because it allowed for a more realistic representation of reality, even though the output was not actually real. This made me think that this is, in essence, the problem relating to the issue of whether computer simulations are patentable or not. What exactly is it about a particular computer simulation that would make it patentable? Is it to do with the type of thing that the simulation models, i.e. whether the thing is an electronic circuit or movement of people in a building? Both, of course, are real physical things and it is possible to get patents for buildings as well as for circuits. That can't be it then. Instead, looking back at why the application in T 1227/05 was considered allowable, the reason for allowing it was, in my view, to do more with the way in which the circuit was simulated that allowed a more realistic representation of noise. A link between the simulation features and the corresponding article in the real world could be established, resulting in a plausible reason for establishing an inventive step. In the case of modelling pedestrian flow in a building, however, even though the argument was made that the way the flow was modelled made the simulation more accurate, this seemed to be a mere assertion without any real backing. More, I think, could have been made about why the particular way the flow was modelled made it more accurate, backed up with evidence as to how this was the case. This was not possible on the basis of the original application, which contains lots of detail about how the model is set up but nothing about how the resulting simulation matched reality. With a circuit this could easily be done. This could also have been done with real people in a real building (or at least a corridor with obstacles, as in the above drawing) but it wasn't. Could it have made the patent application more likely to be granted? I think perhaps it could, but then we wouldn't have had the opportunity to have the Enlarged Board consider the issue. 

While the EB is deliberating, we will for now just have to guess what they think about the issue. Having heard the arguments, however, I think that the key to getting a computer simulation patentable is to show in the application how the way in which the simulation is set up produces a result that is closer to reality. Whether this is the way in which 1/f noise is simulated using random number to model a circuit, how light rays are traced to produce more realistic images or the way in which people are modelled by way of various parameters, it should be possible to show how certain specific features of the claimed invention provide a more realistic representation of reality. That way, I think, is where the path lies in getting simulation methods patented. Whether I am right or not we will just have to wait and see.

PS. A prize for anyone who can spot what word I have deliberately avoided using (with the exception of the quote from T489/14) in this post. Is it any less clear as a result?

UNION-IP Roundtable: Smart IP, Munich 22 Feb 2019

The subject of artificial intelligence (AI) has been of interest for a long time, basically ever since computer technology was envisaged to eventually replicate what could previously only be done with the human mind. Along the way, various tasks that would previously require a human mind have been replicated by computer. Examples that are now considered mundane, or at least well known, but not so long ago would be beyond the capacity of computer technology, include optical character recognition, voice control, machine translation and computer vision for self-driving cars. These technologies are continually changing our working and home lives, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

There is a question as to whether any of this can really be considered AI at all, as there is no suggestion that a conscious computer such as HAL9000 is going to arrive any time soon. For the time being though, the term AI has been applied to many different areas of computer-implemented technology, and of course there is a question of how, or even whether, this technology can be patented and, if it can, what can be done about it.

To help answer this, and some other related questions, a "Round Table" event, which I will be attending, is to be held at the German Patent Office in Munich on 22 February 2019, organised by UNION-IP, titled "Smart IP - Applying intelligence to patenting, licensing and enforcing IP on new technology". This will include presentations from:

• Georg Picht, University of Zurich, providing an introduction;
• Hans Mertens, President of Software Commission of UNION-IP, on Protecting new technologies;
• Georg Weber, Director in the ICT sector of DG1, European Patent Office, on Granting patents for new technologies;
• Rene Allart, Senior IP Counsel (Digital Imaging), Philips, and Peter Hedman, Senior Patent Attorney, Ericsson (Device, Service and Media)on Creating and owning patents for new technologies;
• Matthias Zigann, Presiding Judge, District Court Munich, on Procedural challenges and new dispute solutions;
• Amedeo Santosuosso, President of IP Chamber, Milan Court of Appeal, on IP, AI and legal decision making;
• Johann Pitz, VP IP Litigation Commission of UNION-IP, on Licensing in a digital world;
• Christian Loyau, Legal Director, European Telecommunications Standards Institute, on Licensing for a digital communication world: structures and framework; and
• Dominik Bauer, Senior Manager, Audi AG, on License options and injunctions.

The Round table is divided into three sessions. In the first, an overview of inventions made in different Industry 4.0 fields will be provided (such as smart objects, AI, IoT), with specific aspects of patent applications in new technologies in grant proceedings at the EPO discussed. From the industry perspective, we will hear about patenting strategy considerations, and approaches to obtaining and licensing valuable patents.

In the second session, presentations will address the issue of ownership of IP rights when the author is a learning machine, along with new parameters for infringement and validity assessment, and cross-border issues. Experienced judges will discuss procedural challenges, new dispute resolutions and decision making processes involving new technologies from the administrative and judicial perspective.

In the third session, licensing options and their legal framework in the field of new technologies will be discussed, and in particular the specific challenges ETSI is facing with the improvement of SEP declarations and their impact on FRAND negotiations. From an industry perspective we will hear about the applicability of equity principles in context with injunctions and respective license strategies.

Although there is a packed programme, there will be time during and after the sessions for questions and answers, and plenty of time for further discussion and networking in the lunch break afterwards.

The full programme, including registration details, can be found here, as well as via the UNION-IP website.

I hope to see you there!

More about HAL9000 here, more about why computers may, or may not, become conscious here and here.