|"Gold bitten apple" by Teodor Dukov|
The Enlarged Board in G 1/03 decided that disclaimers to exclude "accidental" A54(3) prior art were allowable, but only where anticipation was "so unrelated and remote that the person skilled in the art would never have taken it into consideration when working on the invention" (point 2.2.2 of the reasons). This allowed a disclaimer to be made that would otherwise fall foul of A123(2), but only in quite limited circumstances.
A further Enlarged Board decision in G 2/10 related to disclaimers, but instead to those that were disclosed in the application as filed. The Board did, however, state that the test to be applied is "whether the skilled person would, using common general knowledge, regard the remaining claimed subject-matter as explicitly or implicitly, but directly and unambiguously, disclosed in the application as filed" (point 4.5.4 of the reasons). This test was, according to G 2/10, the generally accepted "gold standard" for assessing any amendment for compliance with A123(2) EPC.
The question then arises whether the gold standard must also be applied to the type of undisclosed disclaimers that would otherwise be allowable under G 1/03. This situation has arisen in the appeal case, T 437/14, for which a decision has recently issued. The Board has decided to refer the following questions to the Enlarged Board (which will presumably be numbered G 1/16) to decide the issue:
1. Is the standard referred to in G 2/10 for the allowability of disclosed disclaimers under Article 123(2) EPC, i.e. whether the skilled person would, using common general knowledge, regard the subject-matter remaining in the claim after the introduction of the disclaimer as explicitly or implicitly, but directly and unambiguously, disclosed in the application as filed, also to be applied to claims containing undisclosed disclaimers?The issue in this case related to a claim to a range of chemical compounds, in which two disclaimers were introduced during opposition and appeal proceedings. These disclaimers were made to confer novelty over two cited documents, but there was no specific basis in the application as filed for them. Following the test in G 1/03, the Board concluded that the disclaimers did meet the accidental disclosure test, and that the resulting claim was novel, inventive, sufficient and clear. The only question remaining was whether the gold standard mentioned in G 2/10 should also be applied. In some previous cases only G 1/03 was applied, while in others the gold standard was used, resulting in an inconsistency that needed to be resolved.
2. If the answer to the first question is yes, is G 1/03 set aside as regards the exceptions relating to undisclosed disclaimers defined in its answer 2.1?
3. If the answer to the second question is no, i.e. if the exceptions relating to undisclosed disclaimers defined in answer 2.1 of G 1/03 apply in addition to the standard referred to in G 2/10, may this standard be modified in view of these exceptions?
In the Board's view, applying the gold standard of G 2/10 regarding A123(2) would result in the disclaimers not being allowable for the case in point (point 10.2 of reasons). The disclaimers would only be allowable if either only the G 1/03 standard was to be applied to disclaimers due to accidental disclosures or if some modified form of the gold standard test was to be applied.
The Board gave a simple example to illustrate their reasoning. If one takes a bite out of an apple, what remains is recognisably no longer the same apple as the original one. Even though it is still an apple, the apple with the bite taken out of it cannot be regarded as explicitly or implicitly, but directly or unambiguously, "disclosed" in the original apple (point 8.1 of the reasons). The strong suggestion from the Board therefore is that the test in G 1/03 alone is not enough.
Thankfully I do not have to deal with chemical cases where these kinds of issues most often arise, largely due to the way that chemical compounds are often very broadly defined in claims. It has, however, always struck me as a bit odd that an amendment could be made to a claim that had no basis at all in the application as filed. I wonder whether the Enlarged Board will think it odd as well that such a decision could have been made, and set aside G 1/03.