G 1/25 Amicus Briefs - A Brief Summary

Following up from my earlier post about the referral to the Enlarged Board, now that the period for filing written submissions (or 'amicus briefs') has passed, I have reviewed the various submissions that have been filed. Some are very long, and I have reviewed many of them only briefly, although I hope that the EB will review each of them in detail because there are some important points raised. For now, it is interesting to note that, although there is no consensus on the issue (otherwise there would be no need for a referral), there appears to be a strong majority view that Question 1 should be answered with a 'no'. This is, however, not about a democratic vote and the EB will have to come to their decision based on what they think is correct, not what the majority view may be.

Based on a total of 39 submissions filed and visible on the EP register as of today (4 February 2026), including a couple that appear to have been filed late, 27 have suggested an answer of 'no', while only 8 say 'yes'. A few others either provide no answer or are somewhat vague about what the answer should be. The table below is a list of all submissions that I have found (excluding those from the parties to the case), with their proposed answers (where this is discernible), and the pie chart here shows the answers to Question 1.

Many of the submissions make interesting points, some of which are expressed in stronger terms than others, while others carefully sit on the fence or even fail to come to any clear conclusion. It should be remembered that Question 1 does demand a clear answer. It either is, or is not, necessary to comply with the requirements of the EPC to adapt the description to amended claims so as to remove an inconsistency. While there are certainly arguments to be had either way, including what is meant by an 'inconsistency', a clear 'yes' or 'no' is in the end required because it is of primary importance for the EB to be able to come to a clear conclusion on what the EPC actually requires applicants and proprietors to do, and what the EPO is permitted to require them to do. Sitting on the fence, or coming up with reasons based on vague principles that are not actually set out in the EPC, is simply not good enough. 

It would take me far too long to set out in detail all the arguments put forward in the various submissions, most if not all of which have already been made many times over the past few years. Some of the submissions are, however, in my view worth looking at in more detail because they raise interesting points, are well written, or are provocative one way or the other. The following is a very brief selection from the submissions, with links that should hopefully take you directly to the document on the EP register if you want to see more. 

In characteristic American style, AIPLA put forward a combative set of submissions, the main point being that adaptation of the description is an "administrative construct developed originally as a housekeeping measure". This seems to get to the core of what has happened over the past few years, as the EPO has become more strict on adapting the description to the claims. A requirement that was previously typically only one that involved adapting the summary of invention to say something like "the invention is defined in the claims" has gradually become more and more onerous on applicants where the current requirements (although inconsistently applied) force applicants to comb through the entire specification to adjust wording wherever the word "invention" or "embodiment" is used, or even delete entire sections, to appease the examiner. This view is concurred with by Bardele Pagenberg, who state that "Using the concept of consistency as a yardstick for support is in our view wrong and not in accordance with the EPC", and also refer to adaptation of the description being a housekeeping issue. Others further support the point by referring to adaptation of the description being a burden on applicants, with BIA (the UK Bioindustry Association) expressing concern with compulsion, where examiners enforce a mandatory requirement to adapt the description, causing additional cost and uncertainty. Canon Inc go further, saying that "the practice of aligning the description with the claims accepted for grant serves no useful purpose", a point that is matched by the submissions from JEITA and Richardt Patentanwalte, while Ericsson state that "it is not the purpose of opposition and opposition appeal proceedings to tidy up the description". 

Greenwoods make a couple of important points, one being that "if the claims are clear despite the description no amendment to the description appears to be necessary", another being that "it should be up to the applicant proprietor to decide whether to amend the description or the claims to remove inconsistencies that cause genuine difficulty in determining the scope of the claims" (a point which I also made in my thoughts, which were expressed in the submissions from UNION-IP). Another important point is raised in submissions from the IP Federation that support under Article 84 EPC is about "ensuring the invention is sufficiently described to justify the scope of the claims. It does not extend to the reverse" (which is similar to my point about the requirement being unidirectional). A similar point is made by the pseudonymous submissions from "Jackson Lamb", who states that "The support requirement should not be interpreted to require a one-to-one correspondence between the claims and the description". 

A common theme, of course, with all of the above, among others, is the view that there is no requirement of the EPC that mandates amendments to the description. This is, however, not shared by some of the other submissions. The strongest submissions from those who answer 'yes' to Question 1 appear to be from Bugnion, Patentanwaltskammer and (unsurprisingly) from the EPO President, all of which refer to Article 84 EPC as being the primary basis for setting a requirement for description amendments. Bugnion argue that "supported by the description" in Article 84 sets a "mandatory requirement on the description to disclose a solution that is consistent and not in disagreement with the claims", while the EPO President goes further with a public policy type argument about the purpose of Article 84 EPC, which is apparently "to ensure that the public is not left in any doubt as to which subject matter is covered, and which is not". Patentanwaltskammer further argues that "Once it is accepted, following G 1/24, that the description forms an integral part of the framework for claim interpretation under Article 69 EPC, the consistency of the patent text becomes mandatory. A patent text that contains contradictory statements cannot reliably fulfil its function as a basis for interpretation of the claims". This does, however, raise the question of whether it is the patent as granted that should be used for interpreting the claims or, as some would argue, the patent application as filed. 

The submission by Samson & Partner, on behalf of Apple Inc, raises the possibility again of Angora cats (see here for some of my comments relating to this fictional animal), arguing that they "should not be unnecessarily bred and nurtured" by not amending the description to match the claims. Another large patentee Roche, however, argues that this should not be the job of the EPO, and that "the Boards must apply legislation, not act as legislator", also referring to G 1/24. 

Finally, there are a few that stand out for their fence-sitting and vagueness, some of which fail to come to any clear answer to Question 1. Most disappointingly (for me at least) are those from CIPA, who fail to answer with a clear 'no' and instead state that "It is not generally necessary for the description to be adapted to the allowable set of amended claims" (my emphasis). Well, is it or isn't it? Another from Martin Wilming refuses to answer the question at all, and just refers to a previously published article that is clearly against the idea of mandatory description amendments, in which case it is odd that a clear answer is not provided. 

Question 1 is, of course, the most important one to answer. For those that answer 'no', Question 2 then obviously falls away. For those who answer 'yes', however, it is useful to note the justifications that are made for support in the EPC. The most common is Article 84, while other provisions such as Rule 42(1)(c), Rule 48(1)(c) and Article 69 are also mentioned. Question 3 is largely of little concern, with the vast majority simply stating that the same rules should apply in examination as for opposition (although with the proviso that Article 84 works differently, given that it is not a ground of opposition). 

In summary, I think the EB have plenty of arguments, some of them good, to review and work with. I hope they do take them all into account and come up with the correct decision. We may have a while to wait though, and I expect the decision when it does come is going to be a very long one.

Amicus	Question 1	Question 2	Question 3
AIPLA	No	None	No
Bardele Pagenberg	No	None	No
Bayer AG	No	No answer	No
BIA (UK BioIndustry Association)	No	Not applicable	No
Bugnion	Yes	A84, R42(1)(c), R48(1)(c)	No
Canon Inc.	No	No answer	No
CIPA	Vaguely no - “not generally necessary”. Does not answer the question.	No answer required	No
CPI	No	No answer needed	No
D.X. Thomas	Yes	Article 84 and Rule 42(1)(c) EPC	No
EFPIA	No	No answer needed	No
EP&C Patent Attorneys	Yes	A84, A69 EPC	-
epi	No	A84 does not provide legal basis	No
EPO President	Yes	A84, R42(1)(c), R48(1)(c)	No
Ericsson	No	None	No, except for additional focus on A84 during examination
ETH Zurich	No	None recognised	No
FEMIPI	No	No legal basis	No
FICPI	No, provided the subject-matter does not explicitly refer to the claims.	No answer	No, but applicant/proprietor should be given an opportunity to amend.
Francis Hagel	No	No answer	No
Greenwoods	NO (in capitals and bold)	No requirements of the EPC require such adaptation	No
GRUR	No answer	No answer	No answer
IP Federation	No	No provision in the EPC that mandates adaptation of the description	No
IPO (Intellectual Property Owners Association)	No	No requirement of the EPO necessitates such an adaptation	No
“Jackson Lamb”	No	No answer needed	No
Japan Intellectual Property Association	No	Does not apply	No
JEITA	No	No answer necessary	No
Martin Wilming	No answer	No answer	No answer
Michael Stadler et al	No	No answer	No
Michael Snodin	No	No need to answer	No
Ordine Dei Consulenti in Proprieta Industriale	No	No answer needed	No
Patentanwaltskammer	Yes	A84, A69	No
Patentwerk B.V.	Yes	A84, 82, 53, 52(2) EPC	-
Peter De Lange	Yes	R48(1)(c)	No
Richardt Patentanwälte	No	No answer	No
Roche	No	No basis	No
Roy Marsh	No	No answer	No
Samson & Partner (Apple Inc.)	Yes	A84 (?)
Siemens	No	No answer needed	No
UNION	No	No answer needed	No
VPP	No	No answer	No

Accelerate With Care

Section 73 of the UK Patents Act 1977 (as amended) grants the Comptroller power to revoke patents on his own initiative, as opposed to revocation proceedings being initiated under Section 72 by another party. The scope of the Comptroller's powers is strictly limited to: i) novelty only prior art under section 2(3) being uncovered after a patent is granted; ii) an opinion on a patent finding a lack of novelty or inventive step (but only in 'clear cut' cases); and iii) an EP(UK) patent being granted for the same invention as a GB patent. These provisions are only used sparingly, with the third being the most common given that it is not unusual for a GB patent to be granted ahead of a corresponding EP. The second is used more sparingly, and has only been used a few times over the past 11 years (see here for more). The first is, as far as I can work out, even more rare. It is not straightforward to find such cases, especially now as the patents journal has been hobbled since its recent 'update' to remove the ability to filter by applicable section number. One such case, however, has come to light recently by way of a decision from the UK IPO from earlier this month: BL O/0018/26 (Chordata), relating to GB2610710B. 

The application was filed on 19 October 2022. Shortly afterwards, the applicant's then representatives requested accelerated examination on the basis that they were trying to secure investment. The UK IPO accepted the request and issued a combined search and examination report on 20 December 2022, based on a search that was carried out on 15 December 2022, which cited documents of only background relevance. The applicant also requested early publication, resulting in the A publication issuing on 15 March 2023. After some further to-ing and fro-ing, the application was found to be allowable and was granted on 13 December 2023. Importantly, this was only around 14 months after the filing date, meaning that the examiner would not have been able to uncover all potential prior art under section 2(3) before the application was granted. As is standard practice, the applicant was notified in the communication under section 18(4) of this, and that the examiner would complete the search after 21 months from the priority date. 

The search was completed in September 2024 and two further documents were identified: EP4316358A1 and EP4319639A1 (these links will take you to the EP register for each case). Both of these were EP re-publications of earlier international applications, specifically WO 2022/255662 and WO 2022/216819. According to how section 2(3) works, if a published patent document has an earlier priority date but a later publication date, it can only count if it also covers the UK, which would include an international application that enters the UK national phase, a European application designating the UK or an international application that enters the European regional phase and designates the UK (and where the UK designation is not withdrawn). Both of the documents related to international applications that entered the European regional phase and designated the UK, although both had since been deemed withdrawn. WO 2022/255662 was published on 8 December 2022 but WO 2022/216819 was published on 13 October 2022, i.e. six days before the filing date of the application. It is also worth noting (although this did not feature in the decision) that a search carried out on 15 December 2022 could in fact have found both documents and could have identified one of them as being 'intermediate' prior art. 

The hearing officer first looked at the two citations and came to the conclusion that, since one of the them was in fact published before the filing date it could not count as s2(3) prior art but was full prior art under s2(2). Regardless of whether this disclosed the claimed invention (which the examiner asserted it did), it could not be considered further and was ruled out. The other citation did, however, count as s2(3) prior art, so the hearing officer assessed whether it disclosed the claimed invention. In short, after some discussion it was found that claim 1 was not novel over this document. The proprietor would therefore need to do something about it. A further problem was that the proprietor had dispensed with the services of their patent agent and was doing this by themselves. The hearing officer, apparently being more lenient with them than he would perhaps be with a represented proprietor, gave them a few suggestions of which claims were not anticipated by the citation and gave an opportunity to make amendments, but suggested strongly that they sought professional help in doing so. The proprietor was given 3 months to sort things out with the examiner, otherwise the patent would be revoked. 

There are a couple of lessons to be learnt from this case. The first is that, although applications can in some cases be accelerated and granted much sooner than would normally be the case, this comes with a risk that further prior art might not be found until after the application is granted. It is typically a risk that is worth taking, but only if the searches that are carried out in the time given are competently done. The second lesson is that searches are not always competently done, which seems to be the case here, given that the examiner did in fact have plenty of time to find the two additional documents before the application granted. It is an unfortunate fact that searches at the UK IPO often do not uncover relevant prior art that could be found by another examiner. A common occurrence in practice is that a UK search report will find no relevant prior art but a subsequent PCT application on the same claims, searched by an EPO examiner, will find some. If the UK application is granted early, this can invalidate the earlier UK patent, although it can be put right if the PCT application then overrules it in due course (resulting in a patent that has a longer duration too). If, however, the applicant does not have the willingness or money to have this fallback position, they can be left with a weak or invalid patent. Best practice therefore, if acceleration of a UK patent is required, is to keep going with a later filed PCT application and keep options open for as long as possible. 

Some Thoughts on G 1/25

I wrote here about the referral to the Enlarged Board in T 697/22, which has since been allocated the unsurprising case number G 1/25, it being the first (and only) referral to the EB made in 2025. The EPO announced the questions referred here, along with the members of the EB for the case, and inviting written statements by 30 January 2026. According to the EP register for the patent in question, only four submissions (or 'amicus briefs') have been filed to date, three of which are from patent attorneys in private practice and one from FICPI. More submissions are to be expected over the next few weeks, so it may be a bit premature to summarise what has been filed. However, from my brief review the general opinion seems to be against answering question 1 in the affirmative, although with caveats in some cases. We shall see if this impression changes once more submissions are filed this month. 

As a reminder, the questions that have been asked of the EB are the following:

1. If the claims of a European patent are amended during opposition proceedings or opposition-appeal proceedings, and the amendment introduces an inconsistency between the amended claims and the description of the patent, is it necessary, to comply with the requirements of the EPC, to adapt the description to the amended claims so as to remove the inconsistency?
2. If the first question is answered in the affirmative, which requirement(s) of the EPC necessitate(s) such an adaptation?
3. Would the answer to questions 1 and 2 be different if the claims of a European patent application are amended during examination proceedings or examination-appeal proceedings, and the amendment introduces an inconsistency between the amended claims and the description of the patent application?

Question 1 is a bit long-winded but is carefully worded to be specific to the question that needs answering in T 697/22, in which the Board found it couldn't decide whether a request on file was allowable because no amendments had been made to the description to align it with the allowable claims. In general, however, the question raises the issue of whether there is any provision in the EPC that requires such amendments to be made. As has already been found in T 56/21 (commented here), based on a comprehensive review of the EPC and existing case law there is a strong argument to be made that there is in fact no such provision. The 'leading' case law on the subject, however, is that Article 84 EPC provides the basis for requiring description amendments, even though the wording of the Article itself does not say so. 

To answer Question 1, it is worth first considering what problem this is trying to solve. The supposed problem, at least from the perspective of the EPO, relates to cases where there is, in general terms, an “inconsistency” between the claims and the description, i.e. where the claims define the invention having a scope that is different to the description. Such an inconsistency is, however, perfectly normal and expected in any application or patent. This is because the claims are invariably a generalisation of what is set out in detail in the description and drawings, and are therefore intended to define the invention more broadly. The EB has, however, not been asked to decide on how broad a claim can be in light of a more detailed description, which is the specific purpose of Article 84 EPC. Instead, the EB has been asked more generally to decide on whether there are any requirements of the EPC that make it necessary to adapt the description to amended claims to remove an inconsistency. This can only mean that the supposed problem to be addressed is: i) whether a claim that defines a narrower scope than the description and drawings is an inconsistency; and ii) whether the EPC requires that such an inconsistency needs to be resolved by amendment of the description. 

Any supposed inconsistency of the above type between the claims and the description in a European patent will inevitably be a matter for interpretation. If, for example, a particular feature in a claim is defined as being required but the description specifies that the feature is optional, an interpretation of the claim in accordance with Article 69 EPC and G 1/24 is needed. Article 69 EPC requires that the extent of protection shall be determined by the claims but the description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims. G 1/24 similarly sets out that the claims are the starting point and basis for assessing patentability, while the description and drawings shall always be used to interpret the claims when assessing patentability. 

While Article 69 EPC is primarily intended for the purpose of assessing patentability and infringement in post-grant court proceedings, the principles of G 1/24 are directed towards assessing the patentability of claims in proceedings before the EPO and the Boards of Appeal, in which infringement is never an issue. 

A correct interpretation in the above situation should result in the straightforward conclusion that the claim language is the primary source of interpretation. To take a more specific example, if claim 1 defines a product comprising features A, B and C, while the description specifies that C is an optional feature (e.g. as a result of this optional feature being used to amend the claims during prosecution), an interpretation of the scope of the claim according to Article 69 EPC and G 1/24 would not arrive at the conclusion that C is merely optional because this would place primacy of the description over the claim language. Instead, a conclusion would be reached that the description is clearly not consistent with the scope of the claim and should therefore be discounted, at least as far as the optionality of feature C is concerned. The claim does not need to be interpreted more broadly, and the apparent inconsistency therefore has no effect on the scope of the claim, when interpreted correctly. 

In another example, a specific feature in a claim may have a meaning that would be interpreted by the skilled person to have a particular scope when read in isolation but for which a different and broader interpretation is provided by the description. This would also result in an apparent inconsistency between the claim and the description. This is, however, the situation that has already been resolved by G 1/24, in which the EB decided that the description and drawings should always be referred to when interpreting the claims, and not just in the case of a lack of clarity or ambiguity. The problem to be solved in the present case is not therefore how to interpret a narrow feature in a claim when a broader interpretation is provided by the description, since this has already been solved by G 1/24. 

The supposed problem to be solved is therefore not a problem at all, not least because any inconsistency can be easily resolved through the existing rules of interpretation based on Article 69 EPC and G 1/24, depending on the applicable forum. Nevertheless, the question is whether there are, in the wording of Question 1, any “requirements of the EPC” that necessitate the description to be amended when such an inconsistency becomes apparent. 

There are several provisions of the EPC that result in applicants being required to amend the description of an application, which would also apply when allowing an opposed patent to be maintained in amended form. Examples of these provisions include Rule 42, which is commonly used to justify amending the technical field and background section of the description, and Rule 49, which defines formal requirements for the presentation of documents (as now set out in decisions of the President of the EPO). Other requirements such as Rule 48, requiring the removal of irrelevant or unnecessary statements, or the use of SI units (again under Rule 49), may require amendments to the description. These are all, however, formal requirements that have no bearing on whether there is an inconsistency between the claims and the description. 

Article 84 EPC has commonly been used in support of a requirement to resolve any inconsistencies of the above type between the description and claims (the leading case being T 1024/18). Article 84, however, is a requirement on the claims that establishes a unidirectional obligation on the description, which is required to provide a foundation, i.e. support, for the claimed invention. This requirement ensures that the scope of protection defined by the claims does not exceed what is justified by the disclosure of the description and drawings. This requirement differs from, although with some overlap, Article 83 EPC, which requires the disclosure to enable the invention so that the skilled person can reproduce it. A requirement for support does not mean that the boundaries of what the description includes needs to be limited to what is claimed, in the same way that a table does not need to have a supporting surface that has the same extent as an item placed on the table. A broader description still provides support for an invention, provided the scope of the claimed invention is not too broad to be supported. To extend the analogy, a table that is too small to support a larger object may result in the object falling off, i.e. not being supported. In line with the decision of T 56/21, Article 84 EPC does not provide a legal basis for a mandatory adaptation of the description to claims of a more limited scope. 

Given that there are no other provisions of the EPC that could plausibly be used in support of requiring description amendments, the answer to question 1 must be a clear ‘no’. A further point to note, however, is that there may be circumstances where the proprietor may choose to amend the description to address an inconsistency, for example in the situation where a broader definition of a feature is provided in the description compared to the claims. In such cases, it is the proprietor’s responsibility to make any such amendments, and it is the EPO’s responsibility to ensure that any such amendments comply with the requirements of the EPC (such as Article 123(2)). It is not the EPO’s responsibility to place an obligation on the proprietor to make any amendments to resolve any apparent inconsistency. 

Given the answer to Question 1, Question 2 does not require an answer.

To answer Question 3, we only need to consider the different principles that apply during examination leading up to grant compared to examination and appeal following opposition. In examination leading up to grant, there is more scope both for amendment by the applicant and for objections by the examiner, including under Article 84 EPC. Any alleged lack of clarity in a claim may for example be resolved by adjusting the claim wording or introducing a feature from the description. This does not, however, justify placing a requirement on the applicant for amending the description to match the claims, just as there should be no such requirement after grant. The answers to questions 1 and 2 should therefore be no different during examination proceedings before grant. As with the case of a patent post-grant, it should be the applicant’s responsibility to make any amendments to the description that may affect how the claims should be interpreted, and it is the EPO’s responsibility to ensure that any such amendments comply with the requirements of the EPC.

The above comments are only my own thoughts on the subject but I expect they will have broader support in the profession and I hope will get the support of UNION-IP, which should be submitting an amicus brief this month. It will be interesting to see what the overall impression is once all submissions are in.

T 1044/23: application of G 1/23 to un-enabled products

A recent decision from the EPO Boards of Appeal, T 1044/23, has followed the finding in G 1/23 that a product placed on the market is prior art, regardless of whether the product can be reproduced. The decision, however, makes G 1/23 potentially rather limited in terms of how far it can be applied. 

The patent in question, EP3161066, claimed a polyethylene composition in terms of various parameters. Claim 1 as granted read as follows: 

Polyethylene composition having the following features:

1. density of from 0.950 to 0.970 g/cm³, determined according to ISO 1183 at 23°C;

2. MIE from 1 to 30 g/10 min;

3. ratio MIF/MIE from 15 to 30, in particular from 20 to 29 or from 22 to 29, where MIF is the melt flow index at 190°C with a load of 21.60 kg, and MIE is the melt flow index at 190°C with a load of 2.16 kg, both determined according to ISO 1133;

4. ER values from 0.40 to 0.52

The patent was opposed on the grounds that the claimed invention covered two products that were available before the filing date, both being high density polyethylene (HDPE) resins available from the Dow Chemical Company (the opponent). Evidence for the products being available was provided by product datasheets and dated invoices. Certificates of analysis of the products were also provided to show the relevant parameters, which are summarised in the table below.

	Density	MIE	MIF/MIE	ER
Claim 1	0.950-0.970 g/cm3	1-30 g/10 min	15-30	0.40-0.52
D1 DMDA-8904 NT7	0.9516 g/cm3	4.11 g/10 min	22.8	0.50
D9 DMDA-8907 NT7	0.9516 g/cm3	7.08 g/10 min	22.3	0.49
Aux 1		1-25 g/10 min
Aux 2	0.955-0.970 g/cm3

The opposition division, following G 1/92 and the later decision T 1833/14, found that the two products were not considered prior art under Article 54(1) EPC “because their manufacture was not enabled” (point 19 of the decision). They also found the patent to be inventive over two other cited documents due to these documents not disclosing all the parameters in claim 1, in particular the ER value (relating to rheological polydispersity).

The opponent appealed the decision and argued that, according to G 1/23 (which issued after the opposition decision), the requirement for the product to be reproducible was no longer a valid criterion to exclude a commercial product from the prior art. Since both D1 and D9 resins were publicly available before the filing date of the patent, and the evidence showed that both fell within the scope of claim 1, the patent was not novel in view of either resin.

The Board referred to point 1 of the decision in G 1/23, which states:

“A product put on the market before the date of filing of a European patent application cannot be excluded from the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC for the sole reason that its composition or internal structure could not be analysed and reproduced by the skilled person before that date.”

The Board found that, according to the evidence provided, there was no reasonable doubt that the resins were supplied to customers before the filing date of the patent. The resins were therefore considered to be within the state of the art according to Article 54(2) EPC. There was no dispute that the resins did fall within the scope of claim 1 as granted, so the Board found that claim 1 lacked novelty. The first auxiliary request, which limited the MIE range to 1-25, made no difference and therefore also lacked novelty.

The second auxiliary request limited the density to the range 0.955-0.970 g/cm³, which was higher than either prior art resin and therefore novel. The question was then whether the commercially available resins could be considered to be the closest prior art, given that methods to prepare them were not publicly available. G 1/23 only provided guidance on that point to the extent that a commercial product could be selected as the closest prior art but depended on the specific circumstances because the relevant technical teaching that a skilled person would take from the product would always be case specific. The Board referred to comments in G 1/23 about it being obvious to add lemon juice to Coca-Cola for a less sweet taste, even though the recipe was secret. In the present case, even though the resins were not fully reproducible, there was no reason why they could not be a realistic starting point for further developments.

Starting from either resin, the problem to be solved was, in the Board's view, at best the provision of an alternative composition, given that the patent showed that increasing the density tended to result in poorer properties. In light of this, no particular pointer in the prior art would be required. Although the appellant/opponent argued that the skilled person would know how to adjust the density of the resins while maintaining other properties within the claimed ranges, the Board considered that no evidence was provided of what the skilled person would have done to adjust the parameter. It followed that it was not credible that the skilled person would know how to modify the resins to get within the scope of claim 1. The claim according to the second auxiliary request was therefore found to be inventive.

The Board also found that claim 1 of the second auxiliary request was inventive over another of the cited document (D6), which disclosed all parameters except for the ‘ER’ value within the claimed range. Again, the objective problem was considered to be the provision of an alternative composition, but the Board concluded that it was not obvious how the skilled person would obtain a composition within the claimed range starting from the resins disclosed in D6.

The end result of all this appears to be that the scope of G 1/23 for using un-enabled prior art products is going to be limited if the patent claim has the slightest point of novelty, given that it will need to be shown how the skilled person would be able to change the product without knowing how to make it. Even if it is clear that the change would result in a poorer product, this can still result in a finding of inventive step. 

 

Proposed changes to the epi disciplinary procedures

All European Patent Attorneys (EPAs) are automatically members of the Institute of Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office, known for short as epi (deliberately lowercase, for reasons unknown) and have to abide by its rules and regulations. These include a code of conduct, which sets out how EPAs should behave. Alleged breaches of this code, if they come before the epi via a complaint raised against a member, are judged according to the Regulation on discipline for professional representatives. If a member is found to have not complied with the code of conduct, they can face a warning, a reprimand, a fine or, in extreme cases, deletion from the list of professional representatives. Who gets to decide on this, and how, is the task of the disciplinary system of the epi. At the moment, this is made up of the Disciplinary Committee (DC) and the Disciplinary Board (DB). The diagram below illustrates how this system currently works. The DC is made up of 39 members, one from each of the EPC member states, all of whom are EPAs, and is effectively the first point of call for any complaint that makes it to the epi. Each member of the DC is proposed by the epi Council and is either elected or appointed by the Council. The DC decides on complaints and refers serious cases (which are those that may require a fine or deletion) to the DB, which is made up of epi members and lawyers from the EPO. The DC, which only meets a few times a year, can typically take between around 5 and 15 months to decide on a case, while the DB can take longer (in some cases a lot longer), which can stretch the disciplinary procedure to several years. There have been moves to speed up procedure at the DB level but without changing the basic structure of the system. 

An important point to note is that the number of cases the DC and DB have to deal with is small. A total of 72 cases have been considered by DC between 2012 and 2024, averaging around 5 or 6 per year. Of these, only 21 have been referred to the DB. The vast majority of EPAs will therefore not need to have anything to do with the disciplinary procedure and. If they do, will be first judged by their peers and, in most cases, complaints are either dismissed or only minor action is taken. This does not mean that the profession is simply looking after its own regardless of behaviour but more that the profession is in general well run with the great majority of its members being trustworthy and competent (although there are, of course, exceptions that tend to stand out). Appeals from the DC/DB can be made to the disciplinary board of appeal at the EPO and the overall rules are set and amended by the Administrative Council of the EPO. 

One might think that the current system, although slightly odd in having effectively two first instances, would not need changing. If any changes were being considered, there would presumably be wider consultation among those who would be affected, namely all EPAs. However, based on information I have recently received, it appears that changes to the disciplinary system are about to be pushed through that would alter the system in major ways and possibly without any consultation among EPAs. The proposed changes, which are illustrated in the diagram below, in simple terms involve the removal of the DB and consolidating the first instance into a single DC but with a different composition and with much less input from EPAs. 

The details of the changes are not yet clear (at least to me) but appear to involve the EPO having a much greater role in the composition of the replacement DC (which will probably have a different name) and with epi members having a consequently reduced role and therefore less control. The new DC will not have a member from each country and will become less independent from the EPO through including paid lawyers from the EPO on the new DC (all epi members of the current DC are unpaid for their time, while the EPO lawyers would be). While some changes might be worth doing to make the system more efficient, what is slightly disturbing to me is that the proposed changes are apparently being rushed through at what appears to be an unseemly pace. A meeting of the epi Council in just a few days' time could in theory make a decision on what changes are going to be made, followed a few days later by a meeting of the Administrative Council to implement the changes. While it seems unlikely that such an accelerated process could actually happen, this is what appears to be in the works Is there some kind of coup going on by the EPO and others to take over the process, or will normal epi members be fully informed and consulted before anything changes? We should find out soon enough. 

T 697/22 (G 1/25) - Enlarged Board Referral on Description Amendments

I wrote a few months ago about a case at the boards of appeal, T 697/22, where a possible referral to the Enlarged Board (EB) on the question of whether description amendments are required. At the time, the board were considering four questions to be raised to the EB to resolve the issue, and asked the parties to the appeal proceedings for comments. The parties then provided comments and the board has now issued their decision. Three of the questions initially proposed are now to be referred, which are:

1. If the claims of a European patent are amended during opposition proceedings or opposition-appeal proceedings, and the amendment introduces an inconsistency between the amended claims and the description of the patent, is it necessary, to comply with the requirements of the EPC, to adapt the description to the amended claims so as to remove the inconsistency?

2. If the first question is answered in the affirmative, which requirement(s) of the EPC necessitate(s) such an adaptation?

3. Would the answer to questions 1 and 2 be different if the claims of a European patent application are amended during examination proceedings or examination-appeal proceedings, and the amendment introduces an inconsistency between the amended claims and the description of the patent application?

The case in question related to a patent that was opposed and then maintained in amended form. Both parties appealed and the Board ended up deciding that the claims on file according to an auxiliary request were allowable. Due to amendments made to the claims, however, there then existed an inconsistency between claim 1 and parts of the description that described certain claimed features as optional. Based on what was then on file, the Board had to decide whether this inconsistency was in contravention of the requirement of Article 84 EPC that the claims must be supported by the description. The decision that needed to be made was whether this inconsistency made the request allowable or not allowable, giving rise to the first question. 

The Board reviewed the existing case law and found some decisions that were in favour of aligning the description with the claims and others that were not. This resulted in two lines of case law that were clearly diverging. 

According to the first line of case law, adaptation of the description was required when amendments to claims introduced inconsistencies. The leading case on this was identified as T 1024/18, which stated: "According to long established case law of the Boards of Appeal, [Article 84] has been interpreted as requiring the entirety of the description to be consistent with any claims found to meet the requirements of the EPC." This reasoning was followed by T 447/22, T 2685/19, T 1516/20, T 121/20, T 2293/18, T 1968/18, T 2766/17, T 2378/13 and T 3097/19. Other decisions that also came to the same conclusions  included T 169/20, T 673/22 and T 1784/21. In all these decisions, the Board found that the common underlying principle was that there is a legal basis requiring the description to be consistent with the amended claims. Although the principle legal basis provided in most cases was Article 84 EPC, this was not consistently applied. Some decisions cited Rule 42 EPC, either alone or in combination with Article 84, while others referred to a more general legal requirement or cited other provisions including Rules 48 and 71(1) in support. 

According to the second line of case law, which had developed more recently, there was no legal basis for refusing a patent application if there was an inconsistency between any amended claims and the description. This line of case law was started by T 1989/18, which was followed by T 1444/20 and most recently and prominently T 56/21 (see my post here). Other decisions such as T 2194/19 also reached a similar conclusion. According to this line of case law, any inconsistencies between the claims and the description were the applicant's responsibility alone. T 1989/18 for example found that, if the claims were clear in themselves, their clarity was not affected by the description containing unclaimed subject matter, while the board in T 2194/19 rejected both Article 84 and Rule 42 EPC as a basis for adaptation of the description. The board in T 56/21 went further in finding that neither Article 84 EPC nor Rules 42, 43 or 48 provided a legal basis for requiring the description to be amended. 

The Board also referred to a recent UPC decision from Sweden (AGFA NV v Gucci Sweden AB), which found that, although the description should always be referred to when interpreting the claims (which of course is now also a requirement at the EPO following G 1/24), an apparent inconsistency between the claims and the description was not an impediment to upholding a patent with a broader description than a more limited claim. A patent proprietor could not, however, rely on such an inconsistency to interpret a limited claim. 

In summary, the Board decided that question 1 was needed because this determined whether the patent in question was allowable or not and was necessary to resolve the disagreement in the divergent case law. Question 2 was needed to determine, if there was such a requirement, what the legal basis was. Finally, question 3 was needed because the same issue arose during examination proceedings, which the more recent case law had come from. The Board also made reference to G 1/24, following which the question of whether an application could be granted or a patent upheld if there was an inconsistency had become of even greater significance. 

We will now therefore finally, after a couple of previous false starts, get the chance to find out if the EPO's current practice in requiring applicants to amend the description is correct, which many find to be an unnecessary burden, or if the whole thing should be scrapped. I know which way I would decide. We will, however, need to wait a little while to find out. 

UPDATE 5/8/25: The EPO has issued a notice mentioning the G 1/25 referral and which states that "the President of the EPO has decided that proceedings before the examining and opposition divisions should continue". This will mean that the current Guidelines for Examination will continue to apply while the referral is pending and that cases where amendments to the description have been required will not be stayed pending outcome of the referral. Given that this will apply to practically all applications currently pending at the EPO, this is not very surprising. The EPO would clearly prefer it if proceedings did not grind to an almost complete halt while the Enlarged Board consider which way to go.